This paper examines the significance of the public exchange of letters between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt in the wake of the Eichmann trial. Using rhetorical analysis it considers the respective arguments concerning Jewish responsibility, the incompatible political-moral frameworks offered to underpin such judgments, and the extreme identities the correspondents construct for each other. In doing so, it identifies the ultimate significance of the exchange with the total breakdown of discourse it symbolically resulted in -in other words, with the consensus pertaining to the Holocaust leading to a complete incommensurability of the respective political-moral positions. Such a state of affairs is finally accounted for in terms of the far-reaching consensus between Arendt and Scholem, reaching beyond politics and even identity: the total inescapability of Jewishness.
Introduction
Why would people stop talking? What is it that would make them give up the possibility to pursue arguments, to flesh out disagreements and, ultimately, to convince each other on the merits of their respective positions? These are the questions that this paper seeks to answer in relation to the public correspondence between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt in 1963 , in the wake of the latter's publication of the highly controversial book, Eichmann in Jerusalem. 16 Thus, the contexts within which the exchange was invoked varied considerably. However, there has been virtually unanimous consensus that the message of the exchange may be found in illuminating those broader contexts invoked.
Although they have cemented the reputation of the otherwise considerably slim exchange, none of the previous commentaries have ever confronted its most surprising and indeed poignant characteristic: 17 namely, that the correspondence between Gershom
Scholem and Hannah Arendt did not merely expose different judgments, agendas or even moral commitments, but resulted in two erstwhile friends never talking to each other again.
It led to a final and total breakdown of discourse. 95-119. 18 With the full correspondence between Arendt and Scholem now available, the carefully "staged"
manner of this particular exchange may be appreciated. Detailed analysis of it in the context of these private letters, however, would not only stretch the limits of this paper beyond what is possible, but transgress the distinction between the personal and the public that both participants
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While such a state of affairs may simply be attributed to common human frailties (say, grandstanding, arrogance or a progressively deteriorating friendship reaching the tipping point), 19 this paper will argue that it is here that the ultimate political and moral significance of the exchange may be found. In terms of its breakdown, it may be understood to have exposed a collapse in very public discourses contesting the nature, political consequences and moral obligations of a post-Holocaust Jewish identity. Therefore, the task of this paper will be to meet this breakdown head on, and to provide an account of/for it in terms of the ideas, arguments and identities implicitly conveyed in the famous letters.
In doing this, it will adopt a radically different course of analysis from the wealth of existing commentary. Instead of primarily approaching the exchange from any kind of context, it will exclusively focus on the arguments of the participants, and unpack the explicit as well as implicit political-moral contents and identities that are occasioned by found highly important. Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem, Der Briefwechsel: 1939-1964 , ed. Secondly, the paper will not only concern itself with identifying this breakdown.
Rather, it will argue that at the very root of this breakdown a firm consensus between Arendt and Scholem may be found: the mutual commitment to the categorical inescapability of Jewishness. Ultimately, it is this consensus -that Jewishness cannot be forsaken, cannot be hidden, cannot be forgotten -that will tentatively be suggested as a reason why the conversation had so completely broken down. The message that we may uncover from the exchange between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt will therefore be the potentially dangerous consequences of such a commitment.
The clash of interpretations: Judging (the) Jews
It may be the case that the process of "canonization" automatically makes a text lose its radical characteristics. Likewise, it may be that a debate perceived as a "family quarrel" 22 cannot be but the exchange of banal (if grandstanding) positions. Yet if we have a fresh look at Scholem's exposition of his problem with Arendt's book, it is a truly extraordinary statement we encounter:
" […] your thesis that these machinations of the Nazis served in some way to blur the distinction between torturer and victim -a thesis which you employ to belabor the prosecution in the Eichmann trial -seems to me wholly false and tendentious. In the camps, human beings were systematically degraded; they were, as you say, compelled to participate in their own extermination, and to assist in the execution of fellow-prisoners. "In your treatment of the problem of how the Jews reacted to these extreme circumstances -to which neither of us was exposed -I detect, often enough, in place of balanced judgment, a kind of demagogic will-to-overstatement.
Which of us can say today what decisions the elders of the Jews -or whatever we choose to call them -ought to have arrived at in the circumstances? […] There were the Judenräte, for example; some among them were swine, others were saints. I have read a great deal about both varieties. There were among them also many people in no way different from ourselves, who were compelled to make terrible decisions in circumstances that we cannot even begin to reproduce or reconstruct. I do not know whether they were right or wrong. Nor do I presume to judge. I was not there." (SAE, (242) (243) At the conclusion of this passage Scholem reiterates the categorical denial of the possibility of judgment. The basis of the "state of exception" is, presumably, to be found in the compelling state of absolute necessity, metaphorically invoked in the ultimate argument of having not been "there." Where, however, had Scholem not been present, we may ask?
Who, exactly, must not be judged? On the face of it, two apparently non-identical social categories are simultaneously occasioned by him: "the Jews" and the "elders of the Jews."
Would this not bolster Arendt's version of events and contradict Scholem's essential homogeneity of "the Jews"?
Certainly not. The dividing line between the two collapses as the potential differences of category become systematically erased. First, institutional or power divisions within the Jewish community are overwritten, as not only does Scholem choose the institutionally neutral term "elders," but also makes it clear that it does not make any difference what we call them. This is, presumably, due to the extremely "compelling" nature of the "extreme circumstances." Second, it is the "extreme circumstance" of the gas chambers that exclusively defines this situation and creates a uniform whole of the Jewish people by "compelling" all of them to become passive victims. As it is death and passivity that exclusively define the group, no distinction can be made between the part (elders) and the whole (the Jews). And because "extreme circumstances" are the foundations of this category, judgment must categorically be suspended with regard to every single one of its members. Judging (that is, attributing moral responsibility to) any number of "the Jews"
would be equal to judging all of them. As such, the very act of judgment, the very assumption that judgment as such is possible becomes an act of antisemitism. In Scholem's reconstruction, there is no place for a middle ground.
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It is against this background that Arendt has to defend that she had sought to "raise a question" of the moral responsibility of a Jewish institution, the "functionaries." How can the basis from which she ventures into moral probing be more convincing than Scholem's categorical suspension of it?
"[…] we should not forget that we are dealing here with conditions which were terrible and desperate enough, but which were not the conditions of concentration camps. These decisions were made in an atmosphere of terror but not under the immediate pressure and impact of terror. These are important differences in degree, which every student of totalitarianism must know and take into account. These people had still a certain, limited freedom of decision and of action." (SAE, (248) (249) In these words, the scientific mindset of the historian/sociologist asserts itself.
Scholem's homogenous category of "the Jews" is exposed to be based on flimsy sociohistorical assumptions and is therefore divided into the population of the camps and those of the ghettos. Thus, explicit differentiation is made between groups that experience varying degrees of terror and, correspondingly, have thus various degrees of freedom at their disposal. And in creating this distinction the essential condition of moral judgmentfreedom of choice in the situation of "functionaries"/"elders" -is discovered.
Yet, if this is the condition from which to "raise a question," the actual content of the judgment still remains to be seen. What exactly is the problem with "Jewish functionaries," especially that Arendt explicitly clarifies that the issue of "traitors" (SAE, 248)
does not concern her? "I have made my own position plain, and yet it is obvious that you did not understand it. I said that there was no possibility of resistance, but there and nothing happened to them." (SAE, 249)
In Arendt's framework, being a functionary directly translates into immoral conduct, as being a functionary essentially equals being a "murderer." The institution of the Jewish councils became the instrument of death. What is more, if we explore this analogy further, it appears that the "functionaries" also had near-absolute freedom to choose "not to play any other role" than being a "simple Jew"; and thereby to cease being instrumental in killing their own people. While, for Arendt, nothing is expected of people in the camps and no active resistance is deemed possible in the ghettos, it becomes nothing less than a matter of virtually absolute free choice as well as a categorical imperative for Jewish "functionaries" to cease to act altogether, and thereby renounce their murderous role. This is once again an extreme charge and turn of events. For, according to Arendt's version, it is not only that the "functionaries" become (inadvertent but de facto) genocidaires in rejecting the freely available option of becoming "simple Jews". Not only is it the case that those "simple Jews" were killed due to the co-operation of the "functionaries".
But it is exactly because of the stature of those hapless yet solidaire and morally righteous "simple Jews" that these functionaries are now immunized against moral scrutiny in Scholem's logic. The memory of the dead is mobilized to save the face of those that, unintentionally though, co-operated with the Nazis carrying out the genocide. Thus, Arendt clearly does not simply answer Scholem's accusation but he reveals what is a very dubious moral argument underlying his logic.
Yet, to take a step back from the text, it is equally clear that Scholem's criteria for judgment ("being there") did not flow from some flawed scholarly standard (after all, Scholem made a living of analyzing debates in the Middle Ages where he had not been present either) but from an altogether different, existential-moral authority. And similarly, the basis of this authority, the homogenous unity constructed in the category of "the Jews"
may not have sprung from faulty socio-historical notions about the camps and the ghettos.
Rather, it may have been rooted in the identity and existential status of the Jewish people who, after all, were all proclaimed to be dead by the Nazis. In this existential sense, then, any difference within the category may indeed be accidental and immaterial to the ultimate moral judgment. Any part of the category may stand for the whole.
Thus, in reality, it is not the details but the overall framework for making sense of those details that is contested by the correspondents. While in Arendt's socio-historical logic the category of the Jews is constituted (and thereby fragmented) by situational factors, in Scholem's existential-moral one its unity is the very foundation of the situation. And while the former may inevitably tend towards factors that build up action, responsibility and judgment, the latter may provide a better intuition of the overall moral picture. In the first, Jews face and make daily decisions, and become distinguishable on that everyday basis; in the second, they all are the same as the Nazis intended to put all of them into the same boat.
This may be all very well. Yet the main contention of this paper is that there is far more to this exchange than the appropriation of two different frameworks for moral inquiry.
Intriguingly, they do not so much appear to differ from each other as provide mutually exclusive alternatives. For one thing, what Scholem's construction of the homogeneity and categorical unity of "the Jews" conveyed is not simply the presence of an alternative existential-moral consideration. Rather, the ultimate standard for judgment, "being there,"
in effect categorically outlawed any socio-historical ground upon which evaluation may have been carried out. For another, Arendt's distinctions did not simply problematize the hegemony of the existential-moral authority through introducing the criteria of sociology/history, but were themselves similarly absolute. In her framework, an unbridgeable dividing line separated "simple Jews" from "functionaries"; and no overriding difference was indicated between the "functionaries" and the "SS murderers" (at least as far as this particular moral judgment was concerned). Scholem's extreme, categorical prohibition of judgment is thereby replaced with Arendt's equally extreme and categorical judgment on a Jewish institution. And while the former is made possible by the identity of the Jews as Jews becoming the all-encompassing factor of consideration, the latter's sine qua non is the complete neglect of that very factor.
This means that two tasks remain for us. First, the political-moral frameworks from which the alternative judgments and the alternative grounds for judgments emerged must be analyzed in detail. Second, attention must equally be paid to the relationship between these frameworks and the ways in which they can or cannot accommodate each other.
The clash of accounts I: Scholem and the politics of "Ahabath Israel"
It is not only analytic curiosity that prompts us to dig deeper in the exchange. In his letter, Scholem himself alludes to the "root of our disagreement," prefacing what is arguably one of the most quoted paragraphs in 20th-century Jewish intellectual history: "In the Jewish tradition there is a concept, hard to define and yet concrete enough, which we know as Ahabath Israel: 'Love of the Jewish people….' In you, dear Hannah, as in so many intellectuals who came from the German Left, I find little trace of it. A discussion such as is attempted in your book would seem to me to require -you will forgive my mode of expression -the most old-fashioned, the most circumspect, the most exacting treatment possible -precisely because of the feelings aroused by this matter, this matter of the destruction of one-third of our people -and I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no other way." (SAE, (241) (242) The central part of this utterance has always been taken to express some deep and sombre request, alongside the verdict that Arendt falls largely or even totally short of it.
This, then, appears to be the explanation of her book's erroneous historical and moral
judgment.
But what precisely is this "Ahabath Israel," of which there is little trace in Arendt?
Let us first of all observe that, intriguingly, Scholem does not categorize it as an emotion, as some subjective feeling in opposition to the qualities of objectivity or rationality. It is a "concept" that "we know." A curious kind of "concept," on the other hand, as it is "hard to define yet concrete enough." What would such a "concept" be? How come we cannot define this concept? It is not an "emotion," nor is it of theoretical nature either. The only candidate for interpretation may be that the concept of "Ahabath Israel" does not refer to something in the Encyclopedia Judaica. Rather it metaphorically refers to the way "we"
should read the Encyclopedia Judaica. It is a way of doing things, a way of life that is requested by Scholem, and it is this way of life whose "little trace" is accountable for the radical failure of Arendt's political and moral judgment.
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As for the praxis it advocates, we encounter some equally intricate features. Just as it was between cognition and emotion, this in-between-ness appears to be Ahabath Israel's central characteristic in other respects as well. On the one hand, the use of the Hebrew idiom may indicate a unique foreign and arguably incommensurable authority. This authority is removed from the present German/English context, and cannot perhaps ever be assimilated to it, yet it exerts exclusive power over it.
On the other hand, this very standing apart is systematically broken down by Scholem's overall formulation. For a start, we have an explicit judgment here over an identity, the "honest antisemite," suggesting the relevance of some dishonest or unconfessed (or even unconscious) antisemite to the question of Arendt's book. Furthermore, we have the explicit assertion of this "honest" antisemite's argument being the Jews' "historical share of guilt in
Hitler's crime." And this, to remember, was the exact verbatim charge Scholem levelled at
Arendt's book some lines earlier (see above; page xx).
Thus, the ultimate account implied for the reconstructed antisemitic nature of the book may now be a direct line leading from an antisemitic source. Not just the absence of the political-moral framework of "Ahabath Israel," but the alternative presence of the antisemite: not an accident but an intention. By this inference, Scholem places the issue at the ultimate moral stake: not at the level of judgment, not at the level of political-moral framework, but that of the identity and the personal moral deficiency of Hannah Arendt.
The clash of accounts II: Arendt and the politics of "separation"
It is no small challenge that Arendt faces; it is no small (if implicit) charge that has been levelled at her. As with the original charge, Arendt's answer is well known and often Evidently, Arendt disclaims this sort of "'love'" as she advocates the inherently discontinuous position of the critic, who studies, examines, scrutinizes concepts instead of automatically adopting them. Then, as to why this particular "concept" should be examined instead of adopted, it is made clear that she treats it as some sort of emotion vested in collective, political entities. As was the case with the issue of judgment, instead of accepting and justifying her position with regard to Scholem's framework, Arendt subverts and delegitimizes it: it is, in her version, but the first step on the path towards chauvinism and collective egoism.
At the same time, we may at this point enquire why the simple use of emotions or even "love" in this discussion should warrant the ultimate spectre of Nazism. Can we find here any other reason than Arendt's well-documented conviction that the proper place of emotions is in the "human heart['s] darkness" and that politics must never be reduced to "nature"? 29 By the same token, can we find the political-moral framework which this conviction is based on and which is explicitly drawn upon to counter Scholem's "Ahabath Here, Arendt uncovers the explicit framework underlying her stance. It is the bedrock of the Enlightenment and, arguably, the defining achievement of secularism: the separation of state and religion. 30 What is uncovered in "non-separation" is the process whereby concepts or sentiments that were originally directed to the Absolute Being (becoming thereby non-disputable values) are channelled to non-sacred, secular-relative and disputable objects: to the state and the people. As such, for those adhering to the politics of "Ahabath Israel" and "non-separation" in general, state and people will begin to be seen in some distinctively perfect and unearthly light. Beyond the irrationality of emotions, this light may dictate that these objects remain immune from criticism.
Yet if this is so, Arendt's framework brings two radically new aspects to the exchange. For a start, she implicitly disclaims the dispute with, let alone the rejection of, the Jewish people, the Jewish tradition, Zionism or even "Ahabath Israel" itself. Rather, it is a particular practice and rhetoric abusing these concepts that she finds problematic in Gershom Scholem's letter. Instead of the implied solemn claim that he would represent the entire Jewish community, Gershom Scholem is found to propagate a partisan agenda that can essentially be seen as religious Zionist ideology.
Moreover, just as the main feature of this partisan ideological stance is no longer the mere immersion in the "darkness" of love or in the Jewish tradition but the abuse of them, neither is its defining characteristic "simple" chauvinism. That is to say, the politics of There is time for reconstruction and there is time for reflection. Both of the participants' cases have been unpacked here, from the interpretation of the book, through the political-moral framework that such an interpretation should adopt, to the identity constructed to the interlocutor. As with the interpretations we encountered earlier, the 33 Cf. "In circumstances such as these, would there not have been a place for what I can only describe with that modest German word -'Herzenstakt'?" (SAE, 242) accounts and attributions that these letters provided for us in terms of the identity of their correspondent are surely beyond our expectations. Is Arendt a Jewish (quasi-)antisemite while Scholem simply the representative of the Jewish community and the spokesman of the Jewish tradition? Or is Scholem a (quasi-)totalitarian religious Zionist ideologist proceeding towards the destruction of the Jewish political community while Arendt but an "independent" thinker and dissenter? Who, in other words, is the real enemy of the Jews?
Heavy as these questions are, the ultimate dilemma of the exchange is not how we should answer them, but how they could have been implied by eminent intellectuals and (erstwhile) friends in the first place. How is it that they should arrive at such extreme versions as regards the judgment of Jewish moral responsibility during the Final Solution,
with Scholem categorically dismissing any inquiry into this, and Arendt not simply affirming moral inquiry but categorically judging a Jewish institution collectively responsible for mass murder? How is it that they should arrive at extreme versions as regards each other's identity, where Scholem attributes the position of the "Jewish antisemite" to Arendt, and
Arendt the quasi-totalitarian ideologue of religious Zionism to Scholem? It is the case that the correspondents should reach the position where, theoretically as well as practically, the possibility of discourse breaks down completely that we ultimately need to examine.
Thus, it is this extreme and self-destructive nature of this exchange, deriving from the apparent taking of political-moral frameworks ad absurdum, that must be accounted
for. This collapse of discourse will be analyzed by examining how the mutually exclusive identities are constructed from the respective political-moral frameworks.
The consensus of roots: The total inescapability of Jewishness
Thus, we now have to turn to the question of how and why these apparently extreme judgments could be derived from the frameworks of the participants, from "Ahabath Israel" and that of "separation between state and religion." How is the connection constructed to the "Jewish antisemite" as well as to the "many people in Zionist circles" incapable of verging off from the "beaten track," respectively?
Paradoxically enough, if we have another look at the paragraph of "Ahabath Israel,"
we find that Scholem actually concludes with firmly asserting that "I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no other way" (SAE, 242). The transgression of lacking in "Ahabath Israel" and its highly problematic consequences would still not disqualify from being a member of "us," apparently. Or wouldn't they? After all, Scholem clearly does not just assert a matter of fact but a matter of his conviction, creating thereby the aura of ambiguity (i.e., if this is a simple fact, why the need to stress Scholem's conviction?).
Indeed, the best way to understand Scholem's concluding remark is probably not taking it to reflect simply on an already given fact, to describe merely Arendt as a natural member of "us," but to perform, as Judith Butler understands it, an interpellation.
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Interpreted as an interpellation, "I regard you" immediately transforms Arendt as recognizable within "our" moral discourse of "Ahabath Israel." The simple act of "description" immediately constructs her as a moral subject. Yet it is important to note once again that by the time Arendt is constructed in terms of this moral discourse and community, she has already been virtually expelled from it: she is a "natural" member of "us" who nonetheless transgresses the political-moral boundaries this "natural" belonging would naturally prescribe for her.
However, if it is exactly this "natural" category of "us" that prescribes for her to behave/feel/think according to a certain framework, and if her "little trace" of it results in antisemitism -why shouldn't "we" simply let her go? Why should "we" regard her as a daughter of our people, and not assert instead that the boundary has indeed been crossed, and from this moment on she can only appeal to authorities outside of the descriptive-yetprescribing realm of "us"?
There is, I think, only one answer that can be deduced from Scholem's text: there is no way out.
Indeed, if we examine two hitherto unexamined characteristics of the "I regard you" utterance, it is exactly this claim that we find to be implicitly advanced. Namely, what
Scholem says is that he regards Arendt "wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no other way" (my emphases). Not only is therefore the authority of "Ahabath Israel" established by him. It is established as an exclusive and ever-present authority. Needless to say, he is not blind to the fact that Arendt is a woman, a political theorist, an American citizen born in Germany, and so on. Yet, at this moment of reckoning, all of this does not count, as an account must be given in terms of only one category. At this trial of her book, Arendt is a Jew, only a Jew and nothing but a Jew.
But, to probe one step further, what warrants the applicability, relevance and, most importantly, exclusivity of this political-moral framework? Why would Scholem's proclamation of "I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people" and its subsequent firm assignment of Arendt to a political-moral framework (that she has already been depicted to transgress) be an authoritative rhetoric? In other words, why cannot Arendt's conduct be evaluated in terms of other, perfectly just moralities (say, Kantian or Christian)?
At the root of the authority of the authority, it is the spectre of the Jewish antisemite that haunts us again; the Jewish antisemite, that is. For up to this point, we have not yet attributed significance to Kurt Tucholsky's ethnic origin (see page xx). This phrase, Jewish antisemite, does not so much unveil the content of this particular antisemitism as it furnishes us with a particular genealogy of it. Subjects who are regarded by "Ahabath Israel"
as daughters/sons of our people yet reject this call and the way of life it consequently subscribes will turn out to be antisemites.
Thus, to summarize and account for the authority of the authority in explaining the book's unsettling failings, we can reiterate two defining characteristics. First, Scholem's "Ahabath Israel" is an all-embracing, descriptive-yet-prescribing framework. Its force derives from the fact that, in principle, it defines and embraces the life of its subjects in their totality: for Arendt, in this framework, there is simply no escape from being Jewish, no escape from having to account for her conduct in Jewish terms. Second, it is also an exclusive framework in that even the escape from the way of life it prescribes may only come in the terms of this framework. The Jewish antisemite, then, is not simply the outcome of Gershom Scholem's investigation, the final locus of what went wrong, but the element holding his very framework of inquiry, interpretation and attribution together. In constituting the only alternative possible to the identity which "Ahabath Israel" prescribes, it cements its legitimacy alongside the all-embracing and exclusive hold it has over its subjects. Rather, it is that, according to Scholem, because she is Jewish, she will have to behave in a certain way. Arendt's answer does not in any sense counter this conception.
Yet if this is so, these sentences then do not merely testify to the rift but also
showcase an equally fundamental agreement between the two intellectuals. Simply, both regard Jewishness as something that cannot be renounced or left forgotten; something that is inalienable. For both of them, "the Jews" is a group of which there is no way out. It is just that the consequences each of them draw from this fact, this necessity, differ.
This agreement is not an inconsequential coincidence. We have already seen how this conception determined Scholem's traditionalist framework and how its categorical nature (i.e. the impossibility to leave the group) lent the extreme character to his position.
The more unequivocal and natural one's Jewishness is, the more appropriate the request of "Ahabath Israel" will be. Furthermore, the closer "Ahabath Israel" embraces one, the lower is the chance that one will break out in any other form than the "Jewish antisemite." But it may well be that, instead of being a mere anomaly in the logic of enlightened and universal rationality, the inescapability of Jewishness is an equally central and constitutive element of Arendt's framework too. Namely, were it not for Jewishness being a matter of physis, of natural necessity, it could surely be admitted to the public realm of free deliberation. In fact, theoretically speaking, the more it is determined by nature, the less it can be admitted into the free and rational deliberation of (wo)men about the life they desire to live. And the less it can legitimately feature in politics, the more its actual presence will raise the suspicion of a quasi-totalitarian attempt to destroy the group in the political sense. Freedom, both in theory and practice, is either exclusively within Jewishness (Scholem) or exclusively outside of it (Arendt).
Concluding remarks
Some of the consequences of this categorical denial of the freedom to determine "who I am (not)" are already obvious. It made our correspondents reach extreme and mutually exclusive conclusions as regards Jewish moral responsibility during the Final Solution; and it positioned the other beyond the possibility of reasonable discourse. Thus, it did not simply create a traditionalist and a secularist version of politics, but made both of these incapable of discussion: where the question of who we are appeared to feature so prominently in the former that it blinded it to the outside world, and it was ruled out in the latter to the extent that it became incapable of engaging practices of the particular. As such, both in a theoretical and a practical sense, it was the consensus on the categorical inescapability of Jewishness and the impossibility to leave the group that may have been ultimately responsible for the absolute breakdown of discourse.
Yet it is likewise important to point out that the conception of the inescapability of Jewishness may also have had highly problematic bearings for the values and identities that the participants themselves wished to adopt.
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Though Arendt occasioned "independence" as the opposite of "ideology" (see above, page xx), it was not a utopian plateau outside of Plato's cave that she aspired to.
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Independence was to take place within the community (if not within its established institutions and ideologies). In her construction, she explicitly singled out "patriotism" as a positive political value and as the possible identity position of herself (SAE, 247) . She even suggested that parts of her book were "very pro-Israel" (SAE, 250). All this, as we remember, may be translated to her position of speaking as the representative of the threatened collective of "simple Jews" who did not want to play "any other role." 37 To show solidarity and do nothing else, we can grant, is a viable and admirable act if this identity is determined by and adopted in a context of extraordinary and lethal adversity. Identification really is the pivotal political-moral value in this context. However, it is equally important to see that what we affirm there at that particular moment is not at all nature or physis but our solidarity with a group that has been created for destruction by the aggressor. Failing to realize this may lead to an impossible position as soon as the existential threat is over and the time of politics proper would start. There a political community must be forged, there political values must be adopted; and neither of this may be possible if the determining factor of our identity is still simply our identification, if we still aim to be "simple Jews" not playing any other role. Mastery of the "jüdische Sprache" as well as concomitant "disputes and arguments" are inevitable in that political community, and participation in them can 36 Politically (if not epistemologically) speaking, Arendt thus spoke from the position of Michael who should know "Ahabath Israel," just as it obviously held together the category of the Jews whose designation equalled the verdict "to be exterminated," then the community of fate may all-to-easily slip into the community of dead (-in-waiting) . Instead of freedom and the context of choice, the group will then stand for death.
As these last interpretative remarks have suggested, then, the sad exchange between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt was in the last resort an (mis-)encounter about freedom. It was not about lofty ideas on the sovereign power of human beings, nor about metaphysical claims of assuming our wished identifications, or heroically rejecting them all. The issue at stake was not the reduction of the question of who is or is not a Jew to the absolute (and, at the same time, impossible) conception of the pure will. It was about a rather simple and limited issue, to be sure, as far as freedom is concerned: the theoretical possibility of withstanding an authority and of opting out from membership of a community.
The simple possibility to say, on occasion, that one is not a daughter or son of the Jewish people.
So why was this simplest of freedoms denied? Why, when it resulted in extraordinarily unbridgeable and angry political-moral disagreement? Why, when it lead to impossible and bitter accusations and recriminations -and ultimately to the breakdown of conversation?
To understand these questions, there are two final considerations that we shall very briefly take into account. First, that the freedom both Scholem's and Arendt's conceptions eventually denied was that of the not-so-simple solitude that derives from claiming ultimate authority over who we are and standing under the starry sky as truly autonomous beings.
And second, that at the point where we have now arrived, solitude/autonomy or authority, identity or freedom are not any more political, philosophical or moral concepts. The ultimate referent of the destruction of the common sphere may not simply be the
